Aliasing is a known source of challenges in the context of imperative object-oriented languages, which have led to important advances in type systems for aliasing control. However, their large-scale adoption has turned out to be a surprisingly difficult challenge. While new language designs show promise, they do not address the need of aliasing control in existing languages.
Introduction
Uncontrolled aliasing in imperative object-oriented languages introduces a variety of challenges in large-scale software development. Among others, aliasing can increase the difficulty of reasoning about program behavior and software architecture [3] , and it can introduce data races in concurrent programs. These observations have informed the development of a number of type disciplines aimed at providing static aliasing properties, such as linear types [33, 51, 64] , * Work done while at KTH. region inference [62, 63] , unique references [14, 18, 40, 48] , and ownership types [21, 50] .
While there have been important advances in the flexibility and expressiveness of type systems for aliasing control, large-scale adoption has been shown to be a much greater challenge than anticipated. Recent efforts in the context of new language designs like Rust [7] are promising, but they do not address the increasing need for aliasing control in existing, widely-used languages.
One of the most important obstacles to the adoption of a type system extension in a widely-used language with a large ecosystem is the adaptation of existing code, including third-party libraries. Typically, adaptation consists of adding (type) annotations required by the type system extension. With a large ecosystem of existing libraries, this may be prohibitively expensive even for simple annotations. A second, and almost equally critical obstacle is robust support for the entirety of an existing language's type system in a way that satisfies requirements for backward compatibility.
This paper presents a new approach to integrating a flexible type system for isolation and uniqueness into an existing, full-featured language, Scala. Our approach minimizes the annotations necessary for reusing existing code in a context where isolation and uniqueness is required. In the presented system, a single bit of information is enough to decide whether an existing class supports isolation and uniqueness. A key insight of our approach is that this single bit of information is provided by the object-capability discipline [27, 46] . The object capability model is an established methodology in the context of program security, and has been proven in large-scale industrial use for secure sandboxing of JavaScript applications [23, 47, 56] . This paper makes the following contributions:
guage formalizes a type-based notion of object capabilities. The second core language additionally provides external uniqueness via flow-insensitive permissions.
• We provide complete soundness proofs, formally establishing heap separation and uniqueness invariants for our two core languages (Section 4). We have also mechanized the operational semantics and type system of the first core language in Coq (Section B).
• We implement our approach for the full Scala language as a compiler plugin (Section 5). To our knowledge, our implementation of (external) uniqueness is the first to integrate soundly with local type inference in Scala. Moreover, the implementation leverages a unique combination of previous proposals for (a) implicit parameters [24, 25] , and (b) closures with capture control [31, 45] .
• We empirically evaluate the conformity of existing Scala classes to the object capability model on a corpus of over 75,000 LOC of popular open-source projects (Section 6).
Results show that between 21% and 79% of the classes of a project adhere to a strict object capability discipline.
In the following we discuss the most closely related work, and defer a discussion of other related work to Section 7. In Section 8 we conclude.
Selected Related Work. Most closely related to our system are approaches based on permissions or capabilities. Of particular relevance are Haller and Odersky's capabilities for uniqueness [38] in Scala ("Cap4S"). While their work shares our high-level goal of lightweight unique references in Scala, the two approaches are significantly different, with important consequences concerning soundness, robustness, and compatibility. First, Cap4S is based on flowsensitive capabilities which are modeled using Scala's annotations, similar to the use of extended type annotations in Java 8 for pluggable type systems [29] . However, the interaction between Scala's local type inference [53] and annotation propagation has been shown to be a source of unsoundness and implementation complexities for such pluggable type systems [58] ; these challenges are exacerbated in flow-sensitive type systems. In contrast, LACASA models capabilities using Scala's implicits [24] , an intrinsic part of type inference in Scala. In addition, foundations of implicits have been studied [25] , whereas Scala's annotations remain poorly understood. Second, LACASA fundamentally simplifies type checking: as long as a class conforms to the objectcapability model, LACASA's constructs enable isolation and uniqueness for instances of the class. This has two important consequences: (a) a minimal set of additional annotations (a single bit of information per class) enables reusing existing code, and (b) type checking reusable class declarations is simple and well-understood, following the object-capability discipline, which we adapt for Scala. Figure 1 . Two communicating actors in Scala.
A Brief Overview of LACASA
We proceed with an informal overview of LACASA: its programming model in Scala, and its type system.
A First Example. Consider the case of asynchronous communication between two concurrent processes. This style of concurrency is well-supported by the actor model [2, 39] for which multiple implementations exist for Scala [36, 37, 42] . Figure 1 shows the definition of two actor classes. 1 The behavior of each actor is implemented by overriding the receive method inherited from superclass Actor. The receive method is invoked by the actor runtime system whenever an actor is ready to process an incoming message. In the example, whenever ActorA has received an instance of class Start, it creates an instance of class Message, initializes the instance with an integer array, and sends the instance to the next actor. Note that field next of class Start has type ActorRef[Message] (line 27) instead of Actor [Message] . An ActorRef serves as an immutable and serializable handle to an actor. The public interface of ActorRef is minimal; its only purpose is to provide methods for asynchronously sending messages to the ActorRef's underlying actor (an instance of a subclass of Actor). The purpose of ActorRef as a type separate from Actor is to provide a fault handling model similar to Erlang [8] . 2 In this model, a faulty actor may be restarted in a way where its underlying Actor instance is replaced with a new instance of the same class. Importantly, any ActorRef referring to the actor that is being restarted switches to using the new Actor instance in a way that is transparent to clients (which only depend on ActorRefs). This enables introducing fault-handling logic in a modular way (cf. Erlang's OTP library [32] ).
The shown program suffers from multiple safety hazards: first, within the leak method (line 19), the array of the current Message instance is stored in the global singleton object SomeObject (line 20); thus, subsequently, multiple actors could access the array through SomeObject concurrently. Second, after sending newMsg to ActorB (line 6), ActorA mutates the array contained in newMsg (line 7); this could lead to a data race, since ActorB may be accessing newMsg.arr at this point.
LACASA prevents the two safety hazards of the example using two complementary mechanisms: object capabilities and affine access permissions. Figure 2 shows the same example written in LACASA. 3 Figure 3 . LACASA's Actor and ActorRef classes.
1. Actors send and receive boxes of type Box[T], rather than direct object references. As explained in the following, LACASA's type system enforces strong encapsulation properties for boxes.
2. The type of the receive method is changed to additionally include an implicit permission parameter. (We explain implicit permissions in detail below.)
Due to these changes, LACASA provides its own versions of the Actor and ActorRef library classes; Figure 3 shows the main declarations. In combination with LACASA's type system, boxes enforce constraints that directly prevent the first safety hazard in the previous example. Boxes may only encapsulate instances whose classes follow the object-capability discipline. Roughly speaking, the object-capability discipline prevents an object obj from obtaining references that were not explicitly passed to obj via constructor or method calls; in particular, it is illegal for obj to access shared, global singleton objects like SomeObject. As a result, the problematic leak (line 20 in Figure 1 ) causes a compilation error.
Capture Control. In general, the requirement of boxes to encapsulate object-capability safe classes is not sufficient to ensure isolation, as the following example illustrates: In this case, by capturing variable a in the body of open, and by making a an alias of the array in msg, it would be possible to access the array even after sending it (inside msg inside box) to next. To prevent such problematic leaks, the body of open is not allowed to capture anything (i.e., it must not have free variables). Furthermore, the body of open is not allowed to access global singleton objects. Thus, both the access to a on line 4 and the access to SomeObject on line 5 cause compilation errors. Finally, the body of open may only create instances of object-capability safe classes to prevent indirect leaks such as on line 20 in Figure 1 .
The second safety hazard illustrated in Figure 1 , namely accessing a box that has been transferred, is prevented using a combination of boxes, capture control, and access permissions, which we discuss next.
Access Permissions. A box can only be accessed (e.g., using open) at points in the program where its corresponding access permission is in scope. Box operations take an extra argument which is the permission required for accessing the corresponding box. For example, the open invocation on lines 22-24 in Figure 2 takes the acc permission as an argument (highlighted) in addition to the closure. Note that acc is passed within a separate argument list. The main reason for using an additional argument list instead of just an additional argument is the use of implicits to reduce the syntactic overhead (see below).
The static types of access permissions are essential for alias tracking. Importantly, the static types ensure that an access permission is only compatible with a single Box[T] instance. For example, the acc parameter in line 3 has type CanAccess { type C = box.C } where box is a parameter of type Box [Any] . Thus, the type member C of the permission's type is equal to the type member C of box.
In Scala, box.C is a path-dependent type [5, 6] ; box.C is equivalent to the type box.type#C which selects type C from the singleton type box.type. The type box.type is only compatible with singleton types x.type where the type checker can prove that x and box are always aliases. (Thus, in a type box.type, box may not be re-assignable.) Access permissions in LACASA leverage this aliasing property of singleton types: since it is impossible to create a box b such that b.C is equal to the type member C of an existing box, it follows that an access permission is only compatible with at most one instance of Box [T] .
The only way to create an access permission is by creating a box using an mkBox expression. For example, the mkBox expression on line 6 in Figure 2 creates a box of type Box[Message] as well as an access permission. Besides a type argument, mkBox also receives a closure of the form { packed => ... }. The closure's packed parameter encapsulates both the box and the access permission, since both need to be available in the scope of the closure.
Certain operations consume access permissions, causing associated boxes to become unavailable. For example, the message send on line 11 consumes the access permission of packed.box to prevent concurrent accesses from the sender and the receiver. As a result, packed.box is no longer accessible in the continuation of send.
Note that permissions in LACASA are flow-insensitive by design. Therefore, the only way to change the set of available permissions is by entering scopes that prevent access to consumed permissions. In LACASA, this is realized using continuation closures: each operation that changes the set of available permissions also takes a closure that is the continuation of the current computation; the changed set of permissions is only visible in the continuation closure. Furthermore, by discarding the call stack following the execution of a continuation closure, LACASA enforces that scopes where consumed permissions are visible (and therefore "accessible") are never re-entered. The following LACASA operations discard the call stack: mkBox, send, swap (see below). In contrast, open does not discard the call stack, since it does not change the set of permissions.
In the example, the send operation takes a continuation closure (line 11-13) which prevents access to the permission of packed.box; furthermore, the call stack is discarded, making the code from line 14 unreachable.
Implicit Permissions. To make sure access permissions do not have to be explicitly threaded through the program, they are modeled using implicits [24, 25] . For example, consider the receive method in line 2-3. In addition to its regular box parameter, the method has an acc parameter which is marked as implicit. This means at invocation sites of receive the argument passed to the implicit parameter is inferred (or resolved) by the type checker. Importantly, implicit resolution fails if no typecompatible implicit value is in scope, or if multiple ambiguous type-compatible implicit values are in scope. 5 The ben- [23] [24] . In LACASA, these fields, which are identified as unique fields through their box types, have to be accessed using a swap expression. swap "removes" the box of a unique field and replaces it with another box. For example, in line 7, swap extracts the part1 field of the msg box and replaces it with some other box b. The extracted box is accessible via the pack parameter of the subsequent "spore."
Formalization
In this section we formalize the main concepts of LA-CASA in the context of typed object-oriented core languages. Our approach, however, extends to the whole of Scala (see Section 5) .
Our technical development proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we formalize simple object capabilities. In combination with LACASA's boxes and its open construct object capabilities enforce an essential heap separation invariant (Section 3.2).
In the second step, we extend our first core language with lightweight affinity based on flow-insensitive permissions. The extended core language combines permissions and continuation terms to enable expressing (external) uniqueness, ownership transfer, and unique fields.
Soundness, isolation, and uniqueness invariants are established based on small-step operational semantics and syntaxdirected type rules.
Object Capabilities
This section introduces CORELACASA 1 (CLC 1 ), a typed, object-oriented core language with object capabilities.
Syntax Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the syntax of CLC 1 . A program consists of a sequence of class definitions, cd, a sequence of global variable declarations, vd, and a "main" term t. Global variables model top-level, stateful singleton objects of our realization in Scala (see Section 5) . A class C has exactly one superclass D and a (possibly empty) sequence of fields, vd, and methods, md. The superclass may be AnyRef, the superclass of all classes. To simplify the presentation, methods have exactly one parameter x; their body is a term t. There are three kinds of types: class types C, box types Box[C], and the Null type. Null is a subtype of all class types; it is used to assign a type to null.
In order to simplify the presentation of the operational semantics, programs are written in A-normal form [34] (ANF) which requires all subexpressions to be named. We enforce ANF by introducing two separate syntactic categories for terms and expressions, shown in Figure 6 . Terms are either variables or let bindings. Let bindings introduce names for intermediate results. Most expressions are standard, except that the usual object-based expressions, namely field selections, field assignments, and method invocations, have only
box type | Null null type Figure 5 . CLC 1 syntax. C, D range over class names, f , m, x range over term names.
let binding 
Dynamic Semantics
We formalize the dynamic semantics as a small-step operational semantics based on two reduction relations, H, F −→ H , F , and H, F S H , F S . The first relation reduces single (stack) frames F in heap H, whereas the second relation reduces entire frame stacks F S in heap H.
A heap H maps references o ∈ dom(H) to run-time objects C, F M where C is a class type and F M is a field map that maps field names to values in dom(H) ∪ {null}. F S is a sequence of stack frames F ; we use the notation F S = F • F S to indicate that in stack F S frame F is the top-most frame which is followed by frame stack F S .
A single frame F = L, t l consists of a variable environment L = env(F ), a term t, and an annotation l. The variable environment L maps variable names x to values of o using regular selection, assignment, and invocation expressions; instead, accessing o's members requires the use of an open expression to temporarily "borrow" the encap-
A frame annotation l is either empty (or non-existant), expressed as l = , or equal to a variable name x. In the latter case, x is the name of a variable in the next frame which is to be assigned the return value of the current frame. As is common [41] , f ields(C) denotes the fields of class C, and mbody(C, f ) = x → t denotes the body of a method def m(x : σ) : τ = t.
Reduction of a program p = cd vd t begins in an initial
and o g a fresh object identifier; C g is a synthetic class defined as: class C g extends AnyRef {vd}. Thus, a global variable var x : C is accessed using global.x; we treat global as a reserved variable name.
Single Frame Reduction. Figure 7 shows single frame transition rules. Thanks to the fact that terms are in ANF in our core language, the reduced term is a let binding in each case. This means reduction results can be stored immediately in the variable environment, avoiding the intro-
duction of locations or references in the core language syntax. Rule E-BOX is analogous to rule E-NEW, except that variable x is bound to a box reference b(o). As a result, fields of the encapsulated object o are not accessible using regular field selection and assignment, since rules E-SELECT and E-ASSIGN would not be applicable. Apart from E-BOX the transition rules are similar to previous stackbased formalizations of class-based core languages with objects [11, 12, 55] .
Frame Stack Reduction. Figure 8 shows the frame stack transition rules. Rule E-INVOKE creates a new frame, annotated with x, that evaluates the body of the called method. Rule E-RETURN1 uses the annotation y of the top-most frame to return the value of x to its caller's frame. Rule E-RETURN2 enables returning from an -annotated frame. Rule E-OPEN creates such an -annotated frame. In the new frame, the object encapsulated by box y is accessible under alias z. In contrast to E-INVOKE, the new frame does not include the global environment L 0 ; instead, z is the only variable in the (domain of the) new environment.
Static Semantics
Type Assignment. A judgement of the form Γ ; a t : σ assigns type σ to term t in type environment Γ under effect a. When assigning a type to the top-level term of a program the effect a is which is the unrestricted effect. In contrast, the body of an open expression must be well-typed under effect ocap which requires instantiated classes to be ocap.
Well-Formed Programs. Figure 9 shows the rules for wellformed programs. (We write . . . to omit unimportant parts of a program.) A program is well-formed if all its class definitions are well-formed and its top-level term is well-typed in type environment Γ 0 = {global : C g } (WF-PROGRAM); class C g is defined as: class C g extends AnyRef {vd}. Rule WF-CLASS defines well-formed class definitions. In a well-formed class definition (a) all methods are well-formed, Object Capabilities. For a class C to satisfy the constraints of the object-capability discipline, written ocap(C), it must be well-formed according to the rules shown in Figure 10 . Essentially, for a class C we have ocap(C) if its superclass is ocap, the types of its fields are ocap, and its methods are well-formed according to ocap . Rule OCAP-METHOD looks a lot like rule WF-METHOD, but there are two essential differences: first, the method body must be well-typed in a type environment that does not contain the global environment Γ 0 ; thus, global variables are inaccessible. Second,
(T-OPEN) Figure 11 . CLC 1 term and expression typing.
the method body must be well-typed under effect ocap; this means that within the method body only ocap classes may be instantiated.
Subclassing and Subtypes. In CLC 1 , the subtyping relation <:, defined by the class table, is identical to that of FJ [41] except for two additional rules:
(<:-BOX) Null <: σ (<:-NULL)
Term and Expression Typing. Well-Formedness. Frames, frame stacks, and heaps must be well-formed. Figure 12 shows the well-formedness rules for environments, frames, and frame stacks. Essentially, Γ, L are well-formed in heap H if for all variables x ∈ dom(Γ) the type of L(x) in H is a subtype of the static type of Figure 12 . Well-formed environments, frames, and frame stacks.
its term t is well-typed in some environment Γ such that Γ, L are well-formed in H (T-FRAME1, T-FRAME2). A frame stack is well-formed if all its frames are well-typed. Rules T-FS-NA and T-FS-NA2 are required for -annotated frames. Well-typed heaps are defined as follows.
To formalize the heap structure enforced by CLC 1 we use the following definitions. Figure 13 . Separation invariants of frames and frame stacks.
Definition 3 (Separation). Two object identifiers o and o
are separate in heap H, written sep(H, o, o ), iff ∀q, q ∈ dom(H). reach(H, o, q) ∧ reach(H, o , q ) =⇒ q = q .
Definition 4 (Box Separation). For heap H and frame
Definition 5 (Box-Object Separation). For heap H and frame
Definition 6 (Box Ocap Invariant). For heap H and frame
In a well-formed frame, (a) two box references that are not aliases are disjoint (Def. 4), (b) box references and non-box references are disjoint (Def. 5), and (c) all types reachable from box references are ocap (Def. 6).
Definition 7 (Global Ocap Separation). For heap H and frame
In addition, in a well-formed frame that is well-typed under effect ocap, non-box references have ocap types, and they are disjoint from the global variables in L 0 (Def. 7).
The judgement H ; a F ok combines these invariants as shown in Figure 13 ; the corresponding judgement for frame stacks uses the following additional invariants.
Definition 8 (Box Separation). For heap H, frame F , and frame stack F S, boxSeparation(H, F, F S) holds iff
Def. 8 uses auxiliary predicate boxRoot shown in Figure 14. boxRoot(o, F ) holds iff there is a box reference to o in frame F ; boxRoot(o, F S) holds iff there is a box reference to o in one of the frames F S. Informally, boxSeparation(H, F, F S) holds iff non-aliased boxes are disjoint. Figure 14 . Auxiliary predicates.
Definition 9 (Unique Open Box). For heap H, frame F , and frame stack F S, uniqueOpenBox(H, F, F S) holds iff
Def. 9 uses auxiliary predicate openbox shown in Figure 14 . openbox(H, o, F, F S) holds iff boxRoot(o, F S) and there is a local variable in frame F which points to an object reachable from o (box o is "open" in frame F ). Informally, uniqueOpenBox(H, F, F S) holds iff at most one box is open (i.e., accessible via non-box references) in frame F .
Definition 10 (Open Box Propagation). For heap H, frame F l , and frame stack F S, openBoxP ropagation(H, F l , F S)
l preserves the open boxes in the top-most frame of frame stack F S.
According to rule FS-OK shown in Figure 13 , wellformed frame stacks ensure (a) non-aliased boxes are disjoint (Def. 8), (b) at most one box is open (i.e., accessible via non-box references) per frame (Def. 9), and (c) method calls preserve open boxes (Def. 10).
Soundness and Heap Separation
Type soundness of CLC 1 follows from the following preservation and progress theorems. Instead of proving these theorems directly, we prove corresponding theorems for an extended core language (Section 4). 
Theorem 1 (Preservation
The following corollary expresses an essential heap separation invariant enforced by CLC 1 . Informally, the corollary states that objects "within a box" (reachable from a box reference) are never mutated unless their box is "open" (a reference to the box entry object is on the stack). (Figure 14) , there is a frame G ∈ GS such that u → b(o) ∈ env(G ). Well-formedness of F S implies well-formedness of all its frames (FS-OK). Therefore, G is well-formed and by F-OK, o is disjoint from other boxes (def. 4) and other objects (def. 5) reachable in G , including the global variable. By the transition rules, box reference u → b(o) prevents field selection; as a result, between frames F and G there must be a frame created by opening b(o). By E-OPEN, this means there is a frame G ∈ F S such that w → o ∈ env(G).
Corollary 1 (Heap Separation
). If H : then:If H F S, H ; a F S ok, H, F S H , F S , F S = F • GS, F = L, let x = y.f = z in t l , L(y) = o , boxRoot(o, F S),and reach(H, o, o ), then w → o ∈ env(G) where G ∈ F S. Proof sketch. First, by H ; a F S ok, FS-OK, and F S = F • GS we have H ; a F ok. By F-OK we have boxObjSep(H, F ). By def. 5 this means u → b(o) / ∈ L and therefore ¬boxRoot(o, F ). Given that L(y) = o , reach(H, o, o ), and boxRoot(o, F S) it must be that boxRoot(o, GS). Given that boxRoot(o, GS) by def. boxRoot
Lightweight Affinity
This section introduces the CORELACASA 2 language (CLC 2 ) which extends CLC 1 with affinity, such that boxes may be consumed at most once. Access to boxes is controlled using permissions. Permissions themselves are neither flow-sensitive nor affine. Consequently, they can be maintained in the type environment Γ. Our notion of affinity is based on continuation terms: consumption of permissions, and, thus, boxes, is only possible in contexts where an explicit continuation is provided. The consumed permission is then no longer available in the continuation.
Syntax Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the syntactic differences between CLC 2 and CLC 1 : first, field types are either class types C or box types Box[C]; second, we introduce a bottom type ⊥ and guarded types Q Box[C] where Q ranges over a countably infinite supply of abstract types; third, we introduce continuation terms.
In CLC 2 types are divided into surface types which can occur in the surface syntax, and general types, including guarded types, which cannot occur in the surface syntax; guarded types are only introduced by type inference (see we require the continuation term t, because creating a box in addition creates a permission only available in t.
2.
A term capture(x.f, y) {z ⇒ t} merges two boxes x and y by assigning the value of y to the field f of the value of x. In the continuation t (a) y's permission is no longer available, and (b) z refers to box x.
3. A term swap(x.f, y) {z ⇒ t} extracts the value of the unique field x.f and makes it available as the value of a box z in the continuation t; in addition, the value of box y replaces the previous value of x.f . Finally, y's permission is consumed.
Given that only continuation terms can create boxes in CLC 2 , method invocations cannot return boxes unknown to the caller. As a result, any box returned by a method invocation must have been passed as the single argument in the invocation. However, a method that takes a box as an argument, and returns the same box can be expressed using a combination of open and a method that takes the contents of the box as an argument. Therefore, method return types are always class types in CLC 2 , simplifying the meta-theory.
Dynamic Semantics
CLC 2 extends the dynamic semantics compared to CLC 1 with dynamically changing permissions. A dynamic access to a box requires its associated permission to be available. For this, we extend the reduction relations compared to CLC 1 with permission sets P . Thus, a frame L, t, P l com- bines a variable environment L and term t with a set of permissions P . (As before, the label l is used for transferring return values from method invocations.) The transition rules of CLC 2 for single frames are identical to the corresponding transition rules of CLC 1 ; the permission sets do not change. 6 In contrast, the transition rules for frame stacks affect the permission sets of frames.
The extended transition rules of CLC 2 are shown in Figure 17 . Rule E-INVOKE additionally requires permission p to be available in P in case the argument of the invocation is a box protected by p; in this case permission p is also transferred to the new frame (the "activation record"). Reduction gets stuck if permission p is not available. Rules E-RETURN1 and E-RETURN2 do not affect permission sets and are otherwise identical to the corresponding rules of CLC 1 . Rule E-OPEN requires that permission p of the boxto-open b(o, p) is one of the currently available permissions P . The permission set of the new frame is empty. Rule E-BOX creates a box b(o, p) accessible in continuation t using fresh permission p. Note that rule E-BOX discards frame stack F S in favor of the continuation t. Figure 18 shows CLC 2 's two new transition rules. E-CAPTURE merges box b(o, p) and box b(o , p ) by assigning o to field f of object H(o). The semantics of capture is thus similar to that of a regular field assignment. However, capture additionally requires both permissions p and p to be available; moreover, in continuation t permission p is no longer available, effectively consuming box b(o , p ). Like E-BOX, E-CAPTURE discards frame stack F S. Finally, E-SWAP provides access to a unique field f of an object in box Figure 17 . CLC 2 frame stack transition rules. Figure 18 . Transition rules for capture and swap.
b(o, p): in continuation t variable z refers to the previous object o in f ; the object o in box b(o , p ) replaces o . Like E-CAPTURE, E-SWAP requires both permissions p and p to be available, and in continuation t permission p is no longer available, consuming box b(o , p ).
Static Semantics
Well-Formed Programs. CLC 2 adapts method well-formedness for the case where static permissions are propagated to the callee context: the body of a method with a parameter of type Box[D] is type-checked in an environment Γ which includes a static permission Perm[Q] where Q is a fresh abstract type; furthermore, the parameter has a guarded type Q Box [D] . This environment Γ ensures the method body has full access to the argument box. Figure 19 . Well-formed CLC 2 methods. The OCAP-* rules for CLC 2 treat box-typed method parameters analogously, and are left to the appendix.
Subclassing and Subtypes. In CLC 2 , the subtyping relation <: is identical to that of CLC 1 except for one additional rule for the ⊥ type:
The <:-BOT rule says that ⊥ is a subtype of any type π. (Note that type Null is a subtype of any surface type, whereas π ranges over all types including guarded types.)
Term and Expression Typing. Γ ; a y : Figure 21 shows the type rules for CLC 2 's two new expressions. Both rules require x and y to have guarded types such that the corresponding permissions are available in Γ. In both cases the permission of y is removed from the environment used to type-check the continuation t; thus, box y is consumed in each case. In its continuation, capture provides access to box x under alias z; thus, z's type is equal to x's type. In contrast, swap extracts the value of a unique field and provides access to it under alias z in its continuation. CLC 2 ensures the value extracted from the unique field is externally unique. Therefore, the type of z is a guarded type R Box[D] where R is fresh; permission Perm[R] is created for use in continuation t.
Well-Formedness. CLC
2 extends CLC 1 with unique fields of type Box[C] (see Figure 15) ; the following refined definition of well-typed heaps in CLC 2 reflects this extension:
The most interesting additions of CLC 2 with respect to well-formedness concern (a) separation invariants and (b) field uniqueness. In CLC 1 , two boxes x and y are separate as long as x is not an alias of y. In CLC 2 , the separation invariant is more complex, because capture merges two boxes, and swap replaces the value of a unique field. The key idea is to make separation conditional on the availability of permissions.
Box separation for frames in CLC 2 is defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Box Separation). For heap H and frame F ,
Two box references are disjoint if they are guarded by two different permissions which are both available. As soon as a box is consumed, e.g., via capture, box separation no longer holds, as expected. In other invariants like boxObjSep, box permissions are not required. Similarly, the differences in boxOcap and globalOcapSep are minor, and therefore left to the appendix. CLC 2 's addition of unique fields requires a new field uniqueness invariant for well-formed frames:
Definition 13 (Field Uniqueness). For heap H and frame
This invariant expresses the fact that all reference paths from a box b(o, p) to an object o reachable from a unique field f of objectô must "go through" that unique field. In other words, in all reference paths from o to o , the edge (ô, f ) is a dominating edge. (A precise definition of domedge appears in the appendix.)
Frame Stack Invariants. The frame stack invariants of CLC 2 are extended to take the availability of permissions into account. For example, box separation is now only preserved for boxes (a) that are not controlled by the same permission, and (b) whose permissions are available: Definition 14 (Box Separation). Frame F and frame stack F S satisfy the box separation property in H, written
Note that the availability of permissions is required indirectly by the boxRoot predicate (its other details are uninteresting, and therefore omitted). Importantly, for a well-formed frame configuration, CLC 2 ensures that all required permissions are dynamically available; thus, reduction is never stuck due to missing permissions.
Soundness Theorem 3 (Preservation
H, F S H , F S or F S = L, x, P l • or F S = F • GS where • F = L, let x = t in t , P l , t ∈ {y.f, y.f = z, y.m(z), y.open {z ⇒ t }}, and L(y) = null; or • F = L, capture(x.f, y) {z ⇒ t}, P l where L(x) = null ∧ L(y) = null; or • F = L, swap(x.f, y) {z ⇒ t}, P l where L(x) = null ∧ L(y) = null.
Isolation
In order to state an essential isolation theorem, in the following we extend CLC 2 with a simple form of messagepassing concurrency. This extension enables the statement of Theorem 5 which expresses the fact that the type system of CLC 2 enforces data-race freedom in the presence of a shared heap and efficient, by-reference message passing. Figure 22 summarizes the syntax extensions. An expression of the form proc {(x : Box[C]) ⇒ t} creates a concurrent process which applies the function {(x : Box[C]) ⇒ t} to each received message. A continuation term of the form send(x, y) {z ⇒ t} asynchronously sends box y to process x and then applies the continuation closure {z ⇒ t} to x.
Dynamic semantics. CLC
3 extends the dynamic semantics of CLC 2 such that the configuration of a program consists of a shared heap H and a set of processes P. Each pro- Figure 23 . CLC 3 process transition rules.
cess F S o is a frame stack F S labelled with an object identifier o. A heap H maps the object identifier o of a process F S o to a process record Box[C], M, x → t where Box[C] is the type of messages the process can receive, M is a set of object identifiers representing (buffered) incoming messages, and x → t is the message handler function. CLC 3 introduces a third reduction relation H, P H , P which reduces a set of processes P in heap H. Figure 23 shows the process transition rules. Rule E-PROC creates a new process by allocating a process record with an empty received message set and the message type and handler function as specified in the proc expression. The new process o starts out with an empty frame stack, since it is initially idle. Rule E-SEND sends the object identifier in box y to process x. The required permission p of box y is consumed in the resulting frame F . The call stack is discarded, since send is a continuation term. In rule E-RECEIVE process o is ready to process a message from its non-empty set of incoming messages M , since (the term in) frame F cannot be reduced further and there are no other frames on the frame stack. (The operator denotes disjoint set union.) Frame F starts message processing with the parameter bound to a box reference with a fresh permission.
Static semantics. Figure 24 shows the well-formedness rules that CLC 3 introduces for (sets of) processes. A set of processes is well-formed if each process is well-formed (WF-SOUP). A process is well-formed if its frame stack is well-formed (WF-PROC). Figure 25 shows the typing of process creation and message sending. Rule T-PROC requires the body of a new process to be well-typed in an environment that only contains the parameter of the message handler and a matching access permission which is fresh. Importantly, body term t is Figure 24 . CLC 3 well-formedness rules. Figure 25 . CLC 3 typing rules. Figure 26 . CLC 3 process and frame stack isolation.
type-checked under effect ocap. This means that t may only instantiate ocap classes. As a result, it is impossible to access global variables from within the newly created process. Rule T-SEND requires the permission Perm[Q] of sent box y to be available in context Γ. The body t of the continuation closure must be well-typed in a context where Perm[Q] is no longer available. As with all continuation terms, the type of a send term is ⊥. Figure 26 defines a predicate isolated to express isolation of frame stacks and processes. Isolation of frame stacks builds on an accRoot predicate: identifier o is an accessible root in frame F , written accRoot(o, F ), iff env(F ) contains a binding x → o or x → b(o, p) where permission p is available in F (ACC-F) ; o is an accessible root in frame stack F S iff accRoot(o, F ) holds for any frame F ∈ F S (ACC-FS). Two frame stacks are then isolated in H iff all their accessible roots are disjoint in H (ISO-FS). Finally, two processes are isolated iff their message queues and frame stacks are disjoint (ISO-PROC).
Theorem 5 (Isolation). If H : then:
If H P, ∀P, P ∈ P. P = P =⇒ isolated(H, P, P ), and H, P H , P then H : , H P , and ∀Q, Q ∈ P . Q = Q =⇒ isolated(H , Q, Q ).
Theorem 5 states that
preserves isolation of welltyped processes. Isolation is preserved even when boxes are transferred by reference between concurrent processes. Informally, the validity of this statement rests on the preservation of well-formedness of frames, frame stacks, and processes; well-formedness guarantees the separation of boxes with available permissions (def. 12 and def. 14), and the separation of boxes with available permissions from objects "outside" of boxes (def. 15 and def. 17 in A.1).
Implementation
LACASA is implemented as a combination of a compiler plugin for the current Scala 2 reference compiler and a runtime library. The plugin extends the compilation pipeline with an additional phase right after regular type checking. Its main tasks are (a) object-capability checking, (b) checking the stack locality of boxes and permissions, and (c) checking the constraints of LACASA expressions. In turn, (c) requires object-capability checking: type arguments of mkBox invocations must be object-capability safe, and open bodies may only instantiate object-capability safe classes. Certain important constraints are implemented using spores [45] .
Object-Capability Checking in Scala. Our empirical study revealed the importance of certain Scala-specific "tweaks" to conventional object-capability checking. We describe the most important one. The Scala compiler generates so-called "companion" singleton objects for case classes and custom value classes if the corresponding companions do not already exist. For a case class such a synthetic companion object provides, e.g., factory and extractor [30] methods. Synthetic companion objects are object-capability safe.
Leveraging Spores. We leverage constraints supported by spores in several places in LACASA. We provide two examples where spores are used in our implementation.
The first example is the body of an open expression. According to the rules of LACASA, it is not allowed to have free variables (see Section 2) Besides the field accessor functions select and assign (see Section 2), swap receives a box b to be put into the unique field. The implicit acc parameter ensures the availability of b's permission. Crucially, b's permission is consumed by the assignment to the unique field. Therefore, b must not be accessed in the continuation spore, which is expressed using the spore's Excluded type member. As a result, fun's body can no longer capture the permission.
Discarding the stack using exceptions
Certain LACASA operations require discarding the stack of callers in order to ensure consumed access permissions become unavailable. For example, recall the message send shown in Figure 2 Here, the send invocation consumes the access permission: the permission is no longer available in the continuation. This semantics is enforced by ensuring (a) the access permission is unavailable within the explicit continuation closure (line 2), and (b) code following the send invocation (line 4) is unreachable. The former is enforced analogously to swap discussed above. The latter is enforced by discarding the stack of callers.
Discarding the call stack is a well-known technique in Scala, and has been widely used in the context of eventbased actors [37] where the stack of callers is discarded when an actor suspends with just a continuation closure. 7 The implementation consists of throwing an exception which unwinds the call stack up to the actor's event-loop, or up to the boundary of a concurrent task.
Prior to throwing the stack-unwinding exception, operations like send invoke their continuation closure which is provided explicitly by the programmer: The thrown NoReturnControl exception is caught either within the main thread where the main method is wrapped in a try-catch (see below), or within a worker thread of the actor system's thread pool. In the latter case, the task that executes actor code catches the NoReturnControl exception, as shown in Figure 27 . Note that the exception handler is at the actor's "top level:" after processing the received message (in packed) the receiver actor is ready to process the next message (if any).
Scala's standard library provides a special ControlThrowable type for such cases where exceptions are used to manage control flow. The above NoReturnControl type extends ControlThrowable. The latter is defined as follows: 
Empirical Evaluation
The presented approach to object isolation and uniqueness is based on object capabilities. Isolation is enforced only for instances of ocap classes, i.e., classes adhering to the object-capability discipline. Likewise, ownership transfer is supported only for instances of ocap classes. Therefore, it is important to know whether the object-capability discipline imposes an undue burden on developers; or whether, on the contrary, developers tend to design classes and traits in a way that naturally follows the object-capability discipline. Specifically, our empirical evaluation aims to answer the following question: How many classes/traits in medium to large open-source Scala projects already satisfy the objectcapability constraints required by LACASA?
Methodology For our empirical analysis we selected Scala's standard library, a large and widely-used class library, as well as two medium to large open-source Scala applications. In total, our corpus comprises 78,617 source lines of code (obtained using [26] ). Determining the prevalence of ocap classes and traits is especially important in the case of Scala's standard library, since it tells us for which classes/-traits LACASA supports isolation and ownership transfer "out of the box," i.e., without code changes. (We will refer to both classes and traits as "classes" in the following.) The two open-source applications are Signal/Collect (S/C) and GeoTrellis. S/C [61] is a distributed graph processing framework with applications in machine learning and the semantic web, among others. Concurrency and distribution are implemented using the Akka actor framework [42] . Consequently, S/C could also benefit from LACASA's additional Figure 28 . Evaluating the object-capability discipline in real Scala projects. Each project is an active open-source project hosted on GitHub. represents the number of "stars" (or interest) a repository has on GitHub, and represents the number of contributors of the project.
safety. GeoTrellis is a high performance data processing engine for geographic data, used by the City of Asheville [17] (NC, USA) and the U.S. Army, among others. Like S/C, GeoTrellis utilizes actor concurrency through Akka.
In each case we performed a clean build with the LA-CASA compiler plugin enabled. We configured the plugin to check ocap constraints for all compiled classes. In addition, we collected statistics on classes that directly violate ocap constraints through accesses to global singleton objects.
Results Figure 28 shows the collected statistics.
For Scala's standard library we found that 43% of all classes follow the object-capability discipline. While this number might seem low, it is important to note that a strict form of ocap checking was used: accesses to toplevel singleton objects were disallowed, even if these singletons were themselves immutable and object-capability safe. Thus, classes directly using helper singletons were marked as insecure. Interestingly, only 25% of the insecure classes directly access top-level singleton objects. This means, the majority of insecure classes is insecure due to dependencies on other insecure classes. These results can be explained as follows. First, helper singletons (in particular, "companion objects") play an important role in the architecture of Scala's collections package [52] . In turn, with 22,958 SLOC the collections package is by far the library's largest package, accounting for 69% of its total size. Second, due to the high degree of reuse enabled by techniques such as the type class pattern [24] , even a relatively small number of classes that directly depend on singletons leads to an overall 57% of insecure classes.
In S/C 67% of all classes satisfy strict ocap constraints, a significantly higher percentage than for the Scala library. At the same time, the percentage of classes that are not ocap due to direct accesses to top-level singletons is also much higher (78% compared to 25%). This means there is less reuse of insecure classes in S/C. All analyzed components of GeoTrellis have a similarly high percentage of "directly insecure" classes. Interestingly, even with its reliance on "companion objects" and its high degree of reuse, the proportion of ocap classes in the standard library is significantly higher compared to GeoTrellis where it ranges between 21% and 35%.
Immutability and object capabilities Many singleton objects in Scala's standard library (a) are deeply immutable, (b) only create instances of ocap classes, and (c) never access global state. Such singletons are safe to access from within ocap classes. 8 To measure the impact of such singletons on the proportion of ocap classes, we reanalyzed S/C with knowledge of safe singletons in the standard library. As a result, the percentage of ocap classes increased from 67% to 79%, while the proportion of directly insecure classes remained identical. Thus, knowledge of "safe singleton objects" is indeed important for object capabilities in Scala.
Other Related Work
A number of previous approaches leverages permissions or capabilities for uniqueness or related notions. Approaches limited to tree-shaped object structures for unique references include [15, 16, 51, 57, 64, 65] . In contrast, LACASA provides external uniqueness [18] , which allows internallyaliased object graphs. Permissions in LACASA indicate which objects ("boxes") are accessible in the current scope. In contrast, the deny capabilities of the Pony language [22] indicate which operations are denied on aliases to the same object. By distinguishing read/write as well as (actor-)local and global aliases, Pony derives a fine-grained matrix of reference capabilities, which are more expressive than the presented system. While Pony is a new language design, LA-CASA integrates affine references into an existing language, while minimizing the effort for reusing existing classes.
The notion of uniqueness provided by our system is similar to UTT [49] , an extension of Universe types [28] with ownership transfer. Overall, UTT is more flexible, whereas LACASA requires fewer annotations for reusing existing code; it also integrates with Scala's local type inference. Active ownership [19] shares our goal of providing a minimal type system extension, however it requires ownerpolymorphic methods and existential owners whose integration with local type inference is not clear. A more general overview of ownership-based aliasing control is provided in [20] . There is a long line of work on unique object ref-erences [4, 10, 14, 40, 48] which are more restrictive than external uniqueness; a recurring theme is the interaction between unique, immutable, and read-only references, which is also exploited in a variant of C# for systems programming [35] . Several systems combine ownership with concurrency control to prevent data races. RaceFree Java [1] associates fields with locks, and an effect system ensures correct lock acquisition. Boyapati et al. [13] and Zhao [67] extend type system guarantees to deadlock prevention.
Our system takes important inspiration from Loci [66] , a type system for enforcing thread locality which requires very few source annotations. However, LACASA supports ownership transfer, which is outside the domain of Loci. Kilim [60] combines type qualifiers with an intra-procedural shape analysis to ensure isolation of Java-based actors. To simplify the alias analysis and annotation system, messages must be tree-shaped. Messages in LACASA are not restricted to trees; moreover, LACASA uses a type-based approach rather than static analysis. StreamFlex [59] and FlexoTasks [9] are implicit ownership systems for stream-based programming; like LACASA, they allow reusing classes which pass certain sanity checks, but the systems are more restrictive than external uniqueness.
Conclusion
This paper presents a new approach to integrating isolation and uniqueness into an existing full-featured language. A key novelty of the system is its minimization of annotations necessary for reusing existing code. Only a single bit of information per class is required to determine its reusability. Interestingly, this information is provided by the object capability model, a proven methodology for applications in security, such as secure sandboxing. We present a complete formal account of our system, including proofs of key soundness theorems. We implement the system for the full Scala language, and evaluate the object capability model on a corpus of over 75,000 LOC of popular open-source projects. Our results show that between 21% and 79% of the classes of a project adhere to a strict object capability discipline. In summary, we believe our approach has the potential to make a flexible form of uniqueness practical on a large scale and in existing languages with rich type systems. 
A. Full Proofs
A.1 Additional Rules and Definitions Figure 29 shows CLC 2 's OCAP-* rules. Figure 30 shows the updated rules for frame and frame stack typing in CLC 2 . Figure 31 shows the auxiliary predicates boxRoot and openbox. If H F : σ, H ; a F ok, and H, F −→ H , F then H : , H F : σ, and H ; a F ok.
